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RAILROAD LAW
Brent M. Timberlake *
INTRODUCTION
There are relatively few Virginians who go through a day with-
out seeing a train or crossing a railroad track, and yet many mod-
ern-day citizens know very little about the railroad and railroad
law. Certainly the advent of interstate highways and air travel
has lessened the importance of rail travel in the day-to-day lives
of most citizens, but the economy of scale and environmental
friendliness of modern-day railroads promises the launch of a
railroad renaissance in the twenty-first century.1
The Annual Survey of Virginia Law has never featured an ar-
ticle that sought to survey the various areas of law affecting the
railroads. As a result, this article discusses recent judicial deci-
sions affecting the Federal Employers' Liability Act,2 statutory
and judicial decisions affecting railroad safety generally, and a
discussion of the law surrounding railroad crossings in Virginia. 3
* Associate, Troutman Sanders LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2004, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2001, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University.
Mr. Timberlake currently serves on the Transportation Council of the Virginia Bar Asso-
ciation, and has handled numerous railroad matters in state and federal courts.
1. See Emily T. Simon, Stilgoe Predicts the Return of Railroad, HARV. U. GAZETTE
ONLINE, Apr. 10, 2008, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2008/04.10/09-
stilgoe.html.
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000).
3. The heavily unionized nature of the railroad gives rise to some fairly complex leg-
islative enactments and frameworks regarding employment matters that would prove to
make this article too lengthy. As a result, they will not be discussed here.
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I. THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
A. The Historical Origins of the Act
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to understand the appli-
cation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") without
first understanding when and why the FELA was originally
enacted. The FELA was enacted during a time of significant
change in the United States, where industrialization and west-
ward expansion were paving the way for the United States to be-
come the world's economic power following World War I. The
close of the nineteenth century, however, also brought a great
deal of debate over the security and protection of the railroad
workers that were vital to those efforts.4 At the time, the notion
of a workers' compensation scheme was unheard of, and common-
law negligence suits still almost universally employed the doc-
trines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.5 The re-
sult was a situation-much like that of general common-law suits
in Virginia-in which the slightest negligence of a worker would
prevent him from having any means of financial recovery in a
world that had no social protections in place to care for the un-
derprivileged in society. 6
4. See Johnson v. S. Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 19 (1904). The Supreme Court noted:
President Harrison, in his annual messages of 1889, 1890, 1891 and 1892,
earnestly urged upon Congress the necessity of legislation to obviate and re-
duce the loss of life and the injuries due to the prevailing method of coupling
and braking. In his first message he said: "It is competent, I think, for Con-
gress to require uniformity in the construction of cars used in interstate
commerce, and the use of improved safety appliances upon such trains. Time
will be necessary to make the needed changes, but an earnest and intelligent
beginning should be made at once. It is a reproach to our civilization that any
class of American workman should, in the pursuit of a necessary and useful
vocation, be subjected to a peril of life and limb as great as that of a soldier in
time of war."
Id.
5. See S. REP. NO. 76-661, at 4 (1939) (noting that "such simple doctrines do not ap-
ply equitably under the infinite complexities of modern industrial practices").
6. See Andrew R. Klein, Comparative Fault and Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 986 &
n.20 (2006) (quoting Christopher M. Brown & Kirk A. Morgan, Comment, Consideration of
Intentional Torts in Fault Allocation: Disarming the Duty to Protect Against Intentional
Conduct, 2 WYo. L. REV. 483, 510 (2002) ("Jurisdictions adopted comparative fault prin-
ciples to alleviate the harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine. Courts and legis-
latures decided that the doctrine was unfair to the plaintiff because the plaintiff had to
bear the burden of the entire loss if he was only slightly negligent.")).
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In response, the United States Congress enacted the FELA,7
which "abolishe[d] the defenses of contributory negligence and as-
sumed risk and [was] interpreted to impose a liberal view of fault
and causation that makes recovery relatively easy."S Of course,
the abolition of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
was a "liberal" or "progressive" ideal in the early twentieth cen-
tury. Given that Virginia is only one of five remaining jurisdic-
tions to recognize contributory negligence, 9 the FELA has lost
much of its "liberalness and progressiveness" with the passage of
time.
As political moods and movements changed in the United
States and throughout the world in the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, Congress slowly responded by enacting a frame-
work of employer liability schemes around the FELA. In 1916,
Congress enacted the Federal Employees' Compensation Act,
which created a workers' compensation program for federal work-
ers.10 Four years later in 1920, the nation's maritime workers
successfully lobbied Congress to enact the Jones Act, which made
the provisions of the FELA applicable to seaman injured on ves-
sels.11 In 1927, Congress enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, which was designed to provide
workers' compensation protection to those workers who were not
covered under state workers' compensation law, the FELA, or the
Jones Act.12 Over time, other state and federal laws have been
enacted to fill the gaps in existing regulation, regulation that be-
gan in large part with the FELA.
7. Actually, the initial FELA of 1906 was struck down as unconstitutional, but the
current version was later enacted in 1908. See The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S.
463, 504 (1908). Although the original FELA did not contain a prohibition on assumption
of risk, it was specifically amended in 1939 to contain those prohibitions. See Act of Aug.
11, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-382, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-
58 (2000)).
8. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 133, at 312 (2001).
9. Christopher J. Robinette & Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or Comparative: Which
Is the Optimal Negligence Rule?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 45 n.27, 56 (2003).
10. See Federal Employees' Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 64-267, 39 Stat. 742 (1916)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8102 (2006)).
11. See Jones Act, Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified as amended
at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2000)).
12. See Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 117-22 (1962).
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B. The FELA-Negligence Without Draconian Defenses
Given that the FELA was enacted by Congress, the Act does
not apply unless and until it is established that the employee is
engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accidentl3--a
reduced threshold considering the more expansive view of inter-
state commerce taken by the United States Congress and the Su-
preme Court of the United States.14 Specifically, the FELA states
that railroad carriers shall be held liable for injury or death to
railroad workers engaged in interstate commerce "resulting in
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents,
or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insuffi-
ciency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, ma-
chinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equip-
ment."15
Ironically, the FELA did little to create a new cause of action,
rather, it simply codified a common-law cause of action as a
means of recovery for railroad workers.16 The innovation behind
the FELA, however, was its declaration that "the fact that the
employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall
not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the
jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
such employee."17 Further, Congress noted that even comparative
negligence could not be used in those instances in which the rail-
road's violation of a safety statute enacted for the benefit of an
employee proximately caused the employee's injury.18 Later, in
13. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2000) (stating that the FELA covers an injury to "[a]ny employee
of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of inter-
state or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect
such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of this Act be considered as being
employed by such carrier in such commerce").
14. Interestingly, however, this may be less true in light of the Supreme Court's re-
cent decisions abrogating the scope and breadth of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 602 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
15. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
16. See id.
17. See id. § 53.
18. See id. The "safety statutes" envisioned by Congress include the Safety Appliance
Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 20301-06 (2000), and the Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. §§
20701-03 (2000). Courts have clarified that state and local laws are not included within
the meaning of "statute enacted for the safety of employees." See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 503 (1914) ("By the phrase 'any statute enacted for the safety of em-
ployees,' Congress evidently intended Federal statutes, such as the Safety Appliance Acts,
[Vol. 43:337
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1939, Congress amended the FELA to proscribe the use of as-
sumption of risk as an absolute bar to recovery in a negligence
suit brought under the FELA.19
Courts interpreting the FELA shortly after its enactment ap-
peared to recognize that the FELA merely removed the draconian
defenses normally associated with common-law negligence suits
of the time period, and otherwise codified railroad employees'
rights to bring a common-law cause of action against their rail-
road employers.20 Over time, however, the growing use and ac-
ceptance of workers' compensation schemes and similar statutory
frameworks have caused confusion with the FELA and have giv-
en rise to efforts to "liberalize" the reach and scope of the FELA
as something more akin to strict liability than negligence.
and the Hours of Service Act.") (internal citations omitted). Courts have disagreed, howev-
er, as to whether the phrase includes regulations promulgated under statutes like the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2000). Compare Pratico v. Port-
land Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 268 (1st Cir. 1985) ("We find § 653(b)(4) no obstacle to
treating OSHA regulations as safety statutes under § 53 of FELA."), with Bertholf v. Bur-
lington N. R.R., 402 F. Supp. 171, 173 (E.D. Wash. 1975) ("In any case, by the express
terms of OSHA, violation of regulations under that act would not affect plaintiffs recovery
under FELA."). The reasoning employed in Bertholf is the more persuasive of the two, giv-
en the express statutory language contained in OSHA:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner af-
fect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in
any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of
employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or
death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2000) (emphasis added).
19. See Act of Aug. 11, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-382, 53 Stat. 1404, § 4 (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. § 54 (2000) ("[S]uch employee shall not be held to have assumed the
risks of his employment in any case where such injury or death resulted in whole or in
part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier; and no
employee shall be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where the
violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contri-
buted to the injury or death of such employee.")).
20. See Horton, 233 U.S. at 501-02 ("The common law rule is that an employer is not
a guarantor of the safety of the place of work or of the machinery and appliances of the
work; the extent of its duty to its employees is to see that ordinary care and prudence are
exercised, to the end that the place in which the work is to be performed and the tools and
appliances of the work may be safe for the workmen."); see also Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Aeby,
275 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1928) ("There is no liability in the absence of negligence on the part
of the carrier. Its duty in respect of the platform did not make petitioner an insurer of res-
pondent's safety; there was no guaranty that the place would be absolutely safe. The
measure of duty in such cases is reasonable care having regard to the circumstances.") (ci-
tations omitted).
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C. Into the Divide-What Did Congress Mean by "Caused in
Whole or in Part?"
What appears at first glance to be a relatively unimpressive
question is, in reality, the distinction between a FELA that is
something very close to strict liability and a FELA that is more
like the negligence statute intended by Congress. As a result,
lawyers and courts throughout the United States have routinely
struggled to identify the proper test for causation under the FE-
LA.
In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., the Supreme Court
stated that under the FELA an "employer is stripped of his com-
mon-law defenses and for practical purposes the inquiry in these
cases today rarely presents more than the single question wheth-
er negligence of the employer played any part, however small, in
the injury or death which is the subject of the suit."2 1 Although
the Court's language was merely dicta, lower appellate courts and
trial courts across the country focused on the Court's language as
illustrative of the proper standard for causation under the FELA.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Se-
venth Circuit relied upon Rogers in Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern
Railway Co., and held that "a plaintiffs burden when suing under
the FELA is significantly lighter than in an ordinary negligence
case .... [because] a railroad will be held liable where 'employer
negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the in-
jury."'22 The Tenth Circuit in Summers v. Missouri Pacific Rail-
road System also held that the Supreme Court "definitively aban-
doned" the requirement of proximate causation in FELA suits.23
The Ninth Circuit in Funseth v. Great Northern Railway Co. also
found Rogers controlling on the issue of causation under the FE-
LA, and ultimately upheld a jury instruction finding proximate
causation "whenever it appears from a preponderance of the evi-
dence in the case, that the act or omission played any part, no
matter how small, in bringing about, or actually causing, the in-
jury."24
21. 352 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1957) (emphasis added).
22. 414 F.3d 739, 741-42 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rogers, 342 U.S. at 506) (emphasis
added).
23. 132 F.3d 599, 606 (10th Cir. 1997).
24. 399 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit extended
[Vol. 43:337
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Some courts, however, found that because the foundation of the
FELA is negligence, any departure from a requirement of prox-
imate causation was an improper perversion of the FELA into
something it was not. For example, the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana in Marazzato v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. concluded
that under the FELA, "[tihe plaintiff has the burden of proving
that defendant's negligence was the proximate cause in whole or
in part of plaintiffs [death]."25 Similarly, in Gardner v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., the Supreme Court of West Virginia held
that in order "to prevail on a claim under [the FELA], a plaintiff
employee must establish that the defendant employer acted neg-
ligently and that such negligence contributed proximately, in
whole or in part, to plaintiffs injury."26 The Supreme Court of
Iowa in Snipes v. Chicago, Central & Pacific Railroad Co., con-
cluded that "[r]ecovery under the FELA requires an injured em-
ployee to prove that the defendant employer was negligent and
that the negligence proximately caused, in whole or in part, the
accident."27 The Supreme Court of Nebraska followed suit in
Chapman v. Union Pacific Railroad, concluding that "an em-
ployee must prove the employer's negligence and that the alleged
negligence is a proximate cause of the employee's injury" in order
to recover under the FELA.28
Despite the difference of opinion as to whether the "in whole or
in part" language contained in the FELA removes the proximate
cause requirement traditionally found in common-law railroad
actions, the Supreme Court of the United States has largely re-
mained silent since 1957-at least until last year.
this concept to cases under the Boiler Inspection Act in Oglesby v. Southern Pacific Trans-
portation Co., concluding that if a jury could find "'that any negligence of the defendant
contributed in any way or manner, toward an injury or damage suffered by [a] plaintiff, [a
jury] may find that such injury or damage was proximately caused by the defendant's act
or omission."' 6 F.3d 603, 608 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Funseth, 399 F.3d at 920).
25. 817 P.2d 672, 675 (Mont. 1991) (alteration in original) (citing Barilla v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 635 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (D. Ariz. 1986)).
26. 498 S.E.2d 473, 483 (W. Va. 1997).
27. 484 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Iowa 1992).
28. 467 N.W.2d 388, 395 (Neb. 1991).
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D. The Old D.C. Two-Step-Now You See It, Now You Don't
1. All Negligence Under the FELA Employs the Same Standard
of Causation
In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell, the Supreme Court
of the United States was presented with an opportunity to clarify,
affirm, or change its dicta in Rogers, when the highest court in
Missouri ruled that a different and more stringent standard of
causation (i.e., historical proximate causation) applied for an em-
ployee's contributory negligence under the FELA.29 Ultimately,
however, the request of Norfolk Southern Railway Company
("NS") to have the Court define the standard of causation under
the FELA was declined as not properly presented and briefed.30
Mr. Sorrell was employed by NS and was driving a dump truck
when he was approached by another dump truck driven by an NS
employee. 31 Although the versions of the story diverged at that
point, "Sorrell's truck veered off the road and tipped on its side,
injuring him."32 The other employee claimed that Sorrell simply
drove into a ditch, but Sorrell claimed that his truck was run off
the road. 33 Sorrell filed suit against NS in Missouri under the
FELA, alleging back and neck injuries. 34
At trial, NS argued that Mr. Sorrell was contributorily negli-
gent and his damages should be diminished in proportion to his
own negligence pursuant to 45 U.S.C. § 53.35 Interestingly, Mis-
souri courts interpreted the FELA as applying "different stan-
dards of causation to railroad and employee contributory negli-
gence."36 Specifically, a railroad employee could only be found
contributorily negligent "if the employee was negligent and his
negligence 'directly contributed to cause' the injury," whereas a
railroad could be found negligent if "its negligence contributed 'in
whole or in part' to the injury."37 In applying the different stan-
29. 127 S. Ct. 799, 804-05 (2007).
30. See id. at 805.
31. Id. at 802.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 803 (quoting Mo. APPROVED JURY INSTR., CIv., Nos. 24.01, 32.07(B) (6th ed.
[Vol. 43:337
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dards, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Sorrell in the
amount of $1.5 million. 38 NS appealed.
On appeal, NS argued that the differing standards were im-
proper and also asked the Supreme Court of the United States to
address definitively the appropriate standard for causation under
the FELA.39 The Court declined to define the standard of causa-
tion under the FELA, however, concluding that the issue was not
raised on certiorari and thus was not properly before the Court.40
In assessing whether the FELA mandated differing standards for
causation under the FELA for primary and contributory negli-
gence, the Court noted that "[a]bsent express language to the con-
trary, the elements of a FELA claim are determined by reference
to the common law."41 The Court noted that there was no dispute
between the parties that at common law, "the causation stan-
dards for negligence and contributory negligence were the
same."42 The Court went on to note that "[a]s a practical matter,
it is difficult to reduce damages 'in proportion' to the employee's
negligence if the relevance of each party's negligence to the injury
is measured by a different standard of causation."43 Concluding
that nothing within the FELA specifically abrogates the common-
law approach of measuring primary and contributory negligence
under the same standard, the Court held that the "the same
standard of causation applies to railroad negligence under [45
U.S.C. § 51] as to plaintiff contributory negligence under [45
U.S.C. § 53]."44
2. So, What Is the Standard of Causation Employed Under the
FELA?
Although the Supreme Court artfully avoided addressing the
huge elephant in the courtroom, the Court's handling of the ques-
tion does provide some insight into the viability of Rogers and ex-
isting precedent regarding causation under the FELA. Specifical-
ly, the court noted,
2002)) (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 802.
39. Id. at 803-04.
40. Id. at 804-05.
41. Id. at 805 (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 182 (1949)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 807.
44. Id. at 808.
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Although [NS was] doubtless correct that we could consider the ques-
tion of what standard applies as anterior to the question whether the
standards may differ, the issue of the substantive content of the cau-
sation standard is significant enough that we prefer not to address it
when it has not been fully presented.4 5
As an initial matter, if the Court felt the matter had been defi-
nitively addressed in Rogers, then the question would not need to
be addressed, nor would it be significant. The Court also recited
all of the ways in which Congress had departed from common-law
negligence in enacting the FELA, and an alteration of the stan-
dard of causation was not enumerated by the Court.46 Chief Jus-
tice Roberts even hinted at the possibility that the language in
"whole or in part" may have been only a recognition of the fact
that contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery no
longer existed under the FELA:
Even if the language in [45 U.S.C. § 51] is understood to address the
standard of causation, and not simply to reflect the fact that contribu-
tory negligence is no longer a complete bar to recovery, there is no
reason to read the statute as a whole to encompass different causa-
tion standards. [45 U.S.C. § 53] simply does not address causation. 4 7
Perhaps just as importantly, the Court noted that the remedial
nature of the FELA does not dictate the interpretation that must
be given to the FELA.48
Justices Souter, Scalia, and Alito joined the Court's opinion,
but also authored a separate concurring opinion discussing the
proper standard for causation under the FELA.49 Specifically,
Justice Souter wrote that "Rogers did not address, much less al-
ter, existing law governing the degree of causation necessary for
redressing negligence as the cause of negligently inflicted harm;
the case merely instructed courts how to proceed when there are
multiple cognizable causes of an injury."50 He went on to note
that "[p]rior to FELA, it was clear common law that a plaintiff
45. Id. at 805 (emphasis added).
46. See id. at 807 (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1994))
("In Gottshall we 'cataloged' the ways in which FELA expressly departed from the common
law: it abolished the fellow servant rule, rejected contributory negligence in favor of com-
parative negligence, prohibited employers from contracting around the Act, and abolished
the assumption of risk defense.").
47. Id. at 808 (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 809-12 (Souter, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 809-10.
[Vol. 43:337
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had to prove that a defendant's negligence caused his injury prox-
imately, not indirectly or remotely."51 Noting that Rogers relied
upon FELA cases applying the common-law standard of prox-
imate causation, Justice Souter concluded that Rogers did not
change the law of causation in FELA cases. 52
In a separate concurring opinion, however, Justice Ginsburg
concluded that "[i]n [Gottshall] we acknowledged that 'a relaxed
causation standard applies under FELA."'53 Justice Ginsburg
noted that proximate causation has not been eliminated under
the FELA, but rather that Rogers held that "[w]henever a rail-
road's negligence is the slightest cause of the plaintiffs injury, it
is a legal cause, for which the railroad is properly held responsi-
ble."54
The result: Sorrell reveals four justices who appear to support
the finding that the FELA does not alter the common-law stan-
dard for proximate causation, and one justice who definitely disa-
grees. Since Justice Thomas authored the Gottshall opinion,
which acknowledged that "a relaxed standard of causation applies
under FELA,"55 it does not appear that he would join in an opi-
nion concluding that the common-law standard applies. Because
Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and Stevens joined the majority opi-
nion, but not the concurrences, it is uncertain how they would de-
cide the issue. Simply put, the question remains unresolved.
3. Logic Really Only Dictates One Result-Negligence Means
Negligence, Not Strict Liability
As discussed previously, it is important to revisit the origins
and roots of the FELA in order to properly evaluate whether a re-
duced standard of causation is contemplated by the Act. Congress
did not create a new cause of action for railroad workers by enact-
ing the FELA, but merely removed the draconian defenses that
often prevented recovery at common law.56 At the time, the shift
51. Id. at 810.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 812 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512
U.S. 532, 543 (1994)).
54. Id. at 813.
55. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543.
56. 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (2000) ("[I]n such action all statutes of the United States mod-
ifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to [and
2008]
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from contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery to con-
tributory negligence as a reduction in total recovery was innova-
tive and precedent-setting. 57 Clearly this must have been what
Congress was describing when using the phrase "in whole or in
part."s8 The fact that assumption of risk was not abolished for
thirty-one years following the original enactment of the FELA
lends further evidence that the "in whole or in part" language was
meant to refer to the comparative negligence standard rather
than the standard of causation under the FELA.59
To permit a plaintiff to recover for injuries based upon any neg-
ligence of a railroad, no matter how remote, essentially results in
a workers' compensation scheme-something the Supreme Court
of the United States has made clear the FELA is not. 60 Even a
strict liability regime only "means liability without regard to
death of] railway employees shall apply") (emphasis added); see also Rogers v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 948 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir. 1991) ("FELA thus modified or eliminated the common-
law defenses that had precluded railway employees from recovering from their employers
for injuries sustained in the course of their employment.").
57. It should be remembered that comparative negligence, abolition of the fellow-
servant rule, provision of a wrongful death suit, and the abolition of contracts limiting
damages were all very progressive, and were serious departures from the common law in
1906 when the FELA was enacted, and again in 1908 when it was reenacted.
58. So long as the employee was not the sole cause of his injury, of course.
59. See, e.g., Frese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 263 U.S. 1, 3 (1923)
("Whatever may have been the practice, he could not escape his duty, and it would be a
perversion of the [FELA] to hold that he could recover for an injury primarily due to his
failure to act as required, on the ground that possibly the injury might have been pre-
vented if his subordinate had done more.") (citation omitted); Boghich v. Louisville & N. R.
Co., 26 F.2d 361, 362 (5th Cir. 1928) ("It is not sufficient to merely show a violation of the
Safety Appliance Acts to support a recovery. That violation must be the proximate cause of
the injury; and the contributing negligence of the injured employee may be so great as to
bar a recovery."); Kurn v. Reese, 133 P.2d 880, 882 (Okla. 1943) ("When an injury to one
employee results from the combined fault of himself and a fellow-worker, the damages are
divided; but an exception has grown up when the injured employee's fault is the violation
of a rule or an express instruction.") (citation omitted); Hudson v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,
146 S.E. 525, 529 (W. Va. 1928) ("The federal decisions in cases of this character, where
there is a positive duty imposed upon the engineman, hold that he cannot recover on the
theory that other members of his crew were also bound to perform that duty and their neg-
ligence contributed in a proximate way to the injury by nonperformance."); see also McDo-
nald v. Great N. Ry. Co., 207 N.W. 194, 198 (Minn. 1926) ('The fact that McCabe was also
guilty of negligence in his silent permission in allowing the engineer, who was the primary
wrongdoer, to violate the order, will not permit them to recover upon the theory that
McCabe's negligence was a contributing cause. To so hold would permit the anomaly of an
employee violating orders proximately resulting in his own injury to recover upon the
theory that if some other employee had done his duty and prevented the violation the in-
jury would not have occurred.").
60. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. 799, 805 (2007) ("Unlike a typical
workers' compensation scheme, which provides relief without regard to fault, [45 U.S.C. §
51] provides a statutory cause of action sounding in negligence.").
[Vol. 43:337
RAILROAD LAW
fault; it does not normally mean liability for every consequence,
however remote, of one's conduct." 61
Sorrell illustrates how the FELA has grown well beyond its ini-
tial purpose to include injuries and risks that are not peculiar to
the railroad industry-Mr. Sorrell was involved in an automobile
accident, just like thousands of non-railroad workers every
year. 62 Abrogating the common-law doctrine of proximate causa-
tion 63 without any express statement in the FELA would result
in an even greater departure from the intent of the legislation.
Nevertheless, the interpretation offered by Justice Ginsburg
would require just that-liability for every consequence of a rail-
road's conduct, no matter how remote. Such an interpretation be-
lies the foundation of the FELA as a negligence-based statute,
and is likely to be revisited by the current Court.
II. THE FEDERAL RAILROAD SAFETY ACT
A. The Origins of the Federal Railroad Safety Act
In 1970, the United States Congress enacted the Federal Rail-
road Safety Act ("FRSA") "to promote safety in all areas of rail-
road operations and to reduce railroad-related accidents" and in-
cidents.64 Specifically, Congress provided the Secretary of Trans-
61. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 712
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 79 (5th ed. 1984) (describing "practical necessity for the
restriction of liability within some reasonable bounds" in the strict liability context).
62. See Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. at 802; see also id. at 813 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (point-
ing out that '[clognizant of the physical dangers of railroading that resulted in the death
or maiming of thousands of workers every year,' and dissatisfied with the tort remedies
available under state common law, 'Congress crafted a federal remedy that shifted part of
the human overhead of doing business from employees to their employers."' (quoting Con-
sol. Rail Corp. v. Gotshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994))).
63. At the time of the FELA's passage, the doctrine of proximate causation was widely
recognized and accepted at common law. See Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio Sw. R.R., 85 N.E.
499, 504 (Ohio 1908) ("The rule is elementary that a defendant in an action for negligence
can be held to respond in damages only for the immediate and proximate result of the neg-
ligent act complained of, and in determining what is direct or proximate cause the rule
requires that the injury sustained shall be the natural and probable consequence of the
negligence alleged; that is, such consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of
the particular case might, and should have been foreseen or anticipated by the wrongdoer
as likely to follow his negligent act.").
64. Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-458, 84 Stat. 971 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 20101 (2000)). In order to avoid confusion by references to re-
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portation with the authority to "prescribe regulations and issue
orders for every area of railroad safety supplementing laws and
regulations in effect on October 16, 1970."65 Subsequent to the
enactment of the FRSA, the Secretary of Transportation dele-
gated his rulemaking authority under the FRSA to the Adminis-
trator of the Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA").66 Pur-
suant to that authority, FRA promulgated a multitude of
regulations governing everything from equipment on locomotives
to drug testing for railroad personnel. 67 Understanding that the
Secretary of Transportation was entering a field traditionally re-
gulated by state law, Congress specifically indicated its desire to
establish uniform regulations: "Laws, regulations, and orders re-
lated to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent
practicable."68
Courts asked to determine the preemptive effect of the FRSA
over state law causes of action almost universally found in favor
of preemption where specific regulations had been promulgated
covering the subject matter at issue in a lawsuit. 69 For example,
the Supreme Court of the United States was asked in CSX
Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood to assess whether a plaintiff
could maintain an excessive speed claim where a train was oper-
ated within the maximum speed limits promulgated by the
FRA.70 The Court concluded that "under the FRSA, federal regu-
lations adopted by the Secretary of Transportation pre-empt
[Easterwood's] negligence action only insofar as it asserts that pe-
titioner's train was traveling at an excessive speed."7 1
The section of track at issue in Easterwood involved a class
four section for which the maximum speed was sixty miles per
hour by federal regulation. 72 Even though the train was operat-
ing at a speed of less than sixty miles per hour, the plaintiff al-
leged that CSX "breached its common-law duty to operate its
pealed portions of the United States Code, the author will refer to the recodified sections of
the FRSA in Title 49.
65. 49 U.S.C. § 20103 (2000).
66. 49 C.F.R. § 1.49 (2007).
67. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 219 (2007).
68. 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (2000) (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1993).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 676.
72. See id. at 673.
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train at a moderate and safe rate of speed."73 Acknowledging that
the federal regulations only seemed to address the maximum
speed at which trains can travel, the Supreme Court noted that
"related safety regulations adopted by the Secretary reveal that
the limits were adopted only after the hazards posed by track
conditions were taken into account."74 The Court "[ujnderstood
[that] in the context of the overall structure of the regulations,
the speed limits must be read as not only establishing a ceiling,
but also precluding additional state regulation of the sort that
[Easterwood] seeks to impose on [CSX]."75 The Court concluded
that the federal regulations governing maximum train speed
"should be understood as covering the subject matter of train
speed with respect to track conditions, including the conditions
posed by grade crossings." 76
The Supreme Court's decision in Easterwood laid the ground-
work for analyzing whether federal regulations effectively
preempt common-law claims pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 20106. The
only remaining question in most cases was whether the federal
regulations sufficiently illustrated a desire to occupy the field.
Two questions, however, were not answered by the Court: One, do
regulations promulgated pursuant to the FRSA preclude FELA
actions as a result of that statute's basis in common law? Two, do
federal regulations preempt a state law claim where the regula-
tions occupy the field but the defendant railroad has failed to
comply with the regulations?
B. To Preclude or Not To Preclude, That Is the Question
As discussed previously, the Supreme Court of the United
States has made clear that the FELA provides litigants with a
common-law negligence suit with modifications as specifically
enumerated within the body of the Act itself.77 As a result, courts
across the country have been asked to determine whether the
73. Id.
74. Id. at 674.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 675 (emphasis added).
77. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 127 S. Ct. 799, 807 (2007) ("In Gottshall we 'cata-
loged' the ways in which FELA expressly departed from the common law: it abolished the
fellow servant rule, rejected contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence,
prohibited employers from contracting around the Act, and abolished the assumption of
risk defense." (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1994))).
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FRSA's language regarding national uniformity and preemption
operate to preclude certain actions under the FELA.
The majority of courts asked to address the issue have held
that where federal regulations under the FRSA have substantial-
ly covered an area-like train speed, then the goal of uniformity
expressly stated within the FRSA dictates that negligence claims
under the FELA must similarly be precluded when the railroad
has complied with the regulations. 78 For example, when the ques-
tion was presented to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Lane v. R.A. Sims, Jr., Inc., the court concluded
that "uniformity can be achieved only if the regulations covering
train speed are applied similarly to a FELA plaintiffs negligence
claim and a non-railroad-employee plaintiffs state law negligence
claim."79
The court reasoned that if the FRSA is not held to preclude
suits under the FELA where the railroad has complied with fed-
eral regulations, then "a railroad employee could assert a FELA
excessive-speed claim [based on common-law negligence], but a
non-employee motorist [also asserting a claim based upon com-
mon-law negligence] involved in the same collision would be prec-
luded from doing so."so In other words, the court concluded that if
plaintiffs under the FELA could utilize an act which provides
them with a tort-based common-law suit against the railroad
where the railroad has not violated the terms of the FRSA, then
.'[t]he railroad could at one time be in compliance with federal
railroad safety standards with respect to certain classes of plain-
tiffs yet be found negligent under the FELA with respect to other
classes of plaintiffs for the very same conduct."'81
78. See, e.g., Lane v. R.A. Sims, Jr., Inc., 241 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2001); Waymire
v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 218 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2000) ("In Easterwood, the train was
operating within the FRSA prescribed 60 miles per hour speed limit, as was N&W's train
in this case. It would thus seem absurd to reach a contrary conclusion in this case when
the operation of both trains was identical and when the Supreme Court has already found
that the conduct is not culpable negligence."); Dickerson v. Staten Trucking, Inc., 428 F.
Supp. 2d 909, 913 (E.D. Ark. 2006) ("Mindful of the FRSA's goal of national uniformity,
courts have precluded FELA claims when the railroad's underlying conduct was in com-
pliance with specific FRSA regulations."); Rice v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Pac. Ry. Co.,
955 F. Supp. 739, 740-41 (E.D. Ky. 1997); Thirkhill v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 950 F.
Supp. 1105, 1107 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
79. Lane, 241 F.3d at 443.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Waymire v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 65 F. Supp. 2d 951, 955 (S.D. Ind.
1999), affid, 218 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2000)).
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Once again, it is important to remember that the FELA did not
establish a new cause of action, but only removed the draconian
defenses from common-law negligence suits of the time. The
FRSA has expressed its goal of uniformity in railroad regulation
throughout the country. Surely jury verdicts under the FELA
that can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction--or even from jury
to jury within a jurisdiction-pose just as substantial a threat to
uniformity as do common-law suits under state law. The Supreme
Court of the United States found that state common-law suits
cannot qualify for the local hazard exception to the FRSA's goal of
national uniformity because
[t]he state law on which [plaintiffs] rel[y] is concerned with local ha-
zards only in the sense that its application turns on the facts of each
case. The common law of negligence provides a general rule to ad-
dress all hazards caused by lack of due care, not just those owing to
unique local conditions. 82
[T]he Supreme Court found "reliance on the common law 'incom-
patible with' [the] FRSA."83 To conclude otherwise would leave
the FRA powerless to enact meaningful regulation, as an FELA
jury could effectively nullify a regulation of the FRA, or at the
very least find railroads liable for compliance. That just cannot be
the rule.
C. Testing the Limits of Federal Preemption-Noncompliance
with Federal Regulations
In the early morning of January 18, 2002, a Canadian Pacific
("CP") train hauling containers of anhydrous ammonia derailed in
Minot, North Dakota.84 The derailment caused the release of ap-
proximately 220,000 gallons of anhydrous ammonia into the air,
forcing residents to flee their homes. 85 A combination of bad luck
and bad emergency planning resulted in one death, eleven serious
injuries, and 322 major injuries.86 The accident occurred as a re-
sult of a continuous welded rail (essentially one very long and
continuous piece of metal) being replaced with a short "plug rail,"
82. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 675 (1993).
83. Id.
84. See Lundeen v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1008-09 (D. Minn.
2007).
85. Id. at 1009.
86. Id.
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put in place to repair a damaged section of track.87 The National
Transportation Safety Board concluded that the joint bars hold-
ing the plug rail in place were cracked and not properly secured,
and that their failure contributed to the derailment. 88
Following the derailment, many of the residents and their fam-
ilies filed suit against CP alleging negligent track maintenance
and other similar claims.8 9 The suit was initially filed in state
court, but CP removed the case to federal court, asserting that
the plaintiffs had alleged violations of "United States law."90 The
trial court concluded that the reference to "United States law"
created a federal question on the face of the complaint and denied
the plaintiffs' motion for remand.91 Subsequently, however, the
plaintiffs sought and were granted leave to amend their com-
plaints to remove the reference to "United States law," and they
successfully renewed their motion to remand. 92
CP appealed the trial court's remand order to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, contending that the trial
court should not have permitted the amendment and that the
plaintiffs engaged in blatant forum shopping.93 The Eighth Cir-
cuit rejected the forum shopping argument, but noted that the is-
sue of subject matter jurisdiction could be taken up at any time
sua sponte-including on appeal. 94 Specifically, the court con-
cluded that the regulations promulgated by the FRA were suffi-
ciently complete to preempt most, if not all, of the plaintiffs'
claims, and that complete preemption created federal question ju-
risdiction with the district court.95 Accordingly, the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the
case for trial at the federal level.96
On remand, the trial court concluded that virtually all of the
plaintiffs' claims were preempted and that it was irrelevant
whether CP had complied with the regulations they argued
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Lundeen v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 447 F.3d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 2006).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 613-15.
96. Id. at 615.
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preempted the plaintiffs' claims. 97 Specifically, the trial court
reasoned that "[n]either the United States Supreme Court nor the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals requires a railroad to prove FRA
compliance before allowing state law preemption. Both Courts
deem coverage, rather than compliance, to be preemption's touch-
stone."98
Another court in the Eighth Circuit-the United States District
Court for the District of North Dakota-was also asked to deter-
mine whether some of the Minot plaintiffs' claims were
preempted under the FRSA in Mehl v. Canadian Pacific Railway,
Ltd.99 The court similarly concluded that the preemption analysis
did not permit the court to assess or discuss compliance as a con-
dition precedent to the application of the preemption doctrine; as
such, the court concluded that virtually all of the plaintiffs' claims
were preempted.100 Apparently dismayed by his own ruling, the
trial court judge went on to state that "[w]hile the [FRSA] does
provide for civil penalties to be imposed on non-compliant rail-
roads, the legislation fails to provide any method to make injured
parties whole and, in fact, closes every available door and remedy
for injured parties."101 The court noted that the lack of any me-
chanism leaves "the judicial system ... with a law that is inhe-
rently unfair to innocent bystanders and property owners who
may be injured by the negligent actions of railroad companies."102
Accordingly, the trial court asked for legislative action addressing
the lack of available remedies. 103 Congress eventually responded.
D. Congress's Clarification of FRSA Preemption
On August 3, 2007, the President signed into law the Imple-
menting Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
containing provisions in section 1528 that amend the FRSA to
"rectify the Federal court decisions related to the [January 18,
2002] Minot, North Dakota accident that are in conflict with
97. Lundeen, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-13.
98. Id.
99. 417 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1120 (D.N.D. 2006).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1020-21.
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precedent."104 Section 1528 is, by its own terms, a clarifying
amendment that does not work any substantive change to the ex-
isting law. 105
Through section 1528, Congress retained and reaffirmed the
FRSA's preemption provision and goal of national uniformity in
railroad regulation by republishing the existing statute under
subpart (a).10 6 As explained by the legislative history, section
20106(a) "contains the exact text of 49 U.S.C. § 20106 as it existed
prior to enactment of [the 9/11 Act]. It is restructured for clarifi-
cation purposes; however, the restructuring is not intended to in-
dicate any substantive change in the meaning of the provision."107
Section 1528 then adds two new subsections, 49 U.S.C. § 20106(b)
and (c), that "rectify" the Minot derailment cases.108
In other words, the FRSA amendment serves to clarify cir-
cumstances in which the FRSA's preemption clause does not bar
a state law cause of action-namely, in those circumstances
where the railroad has failed to comply with the federal regula-
tion through which preemption is sought. First, the amendment
clarifies that state lawsuits based upon a railroad's failure to
comply with a federal standard of care established in a regulation
that covers the subject matter of the state requirement are not
preempted. 109 Second, the amendment clarifies that the FRSA al-
lows state actions based upon a railroad's failure to comply with
its own internal rules that are created pursuant to federal regula-
tion.110 Finally, completing the universe, subsection (b)(1)(C) cap-
tures all remaining state claims that are not preempted by ("not
incompatible with") the operative language of subsection (a).111
104. H.R. REP. No. 110-259, at 351 (2007) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N.
119, 183; see also Mehl, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (preemption applies even if railroad failed
to comply with applicable federal regulation); Lundeen v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 507 F.
Supp. 2d 1006, 1012-13 (D. Minn. 2007) (preemption applies even if railroad failed to
comply with regulations requiring it to create internal plan).
105. H.R. REP. No. 110-259, at 351.
106. Id.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 110-53, § 1528, 121 Stat. 266, 453 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20106).
109. See § 1528(b)(1)(A), 121 Stat. at 453; Mehl, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (claim barred
even if railroad failed to comply with federal regulation).
110. See § 1528(b)(1)(B), 121 Stat. at 453; cf. Lundeen v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 507 F.
Supp. 2d 1006, 1012-13 (D. Minn. 2007) (claim barred even if railroad failed to comply
with federal regulation requiring the creation of an internal plan).
111. § 1528(b)(1)(C), 1121 Stat. at 453.
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Courts assessing the impact of the clarification amendment to
the FRSA have generally concluded that preemption remains
alive and well under the FRSA except in those certain enume-
rated instances where Congress has specifically stated that it
does not-i.e., where a railroad has failed to comply with a feder-
al regulation through which preemption is sought.112 Just as im-
portantly, the FRA has expressly rejected any contention that the
clarification amendment made any substantive change to the
FRSA's preemptive effect.113 Congress's amendment also makes
clear that FRSA preemption cannot be used to confer federal
question jurisdiction over a case by federal courts.1 14 A fair read-
ing of the clarification language reveals only one interpretation-
FRSA preemption over common-law-based claims continues to ex-
ist as a means of ensuring uniformity in railroad regulation in
those cases in which the railroad has complied with the regula-
tion.11 5
III. RAILROAD CROSSING LAW
The most frequent contact Virginians have with railroad com-
panies is the traversing of railroad crossings during travels on
Virginia's road system. To the uninformed observer, railroad
crossings seem technically unimpressive. The truth is, the FRA,
the Virginia Department of Transportation, and each of the
state's railroads put a great deal of thought and resources into
ensuring the public's safety when crossing railroads in Virginia.
112. See, e.g., Murrell v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 06-97-AA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28886, at *20 (D. Or. Apr. 4, 2008) ("[The amendment to section 20106 did not change the
findings that common law negligence claims would be preempted by federal law as long as
such state law claims are covered by federal regulations pursuant to section 20106. There-
fore, the Court's decision in Shanklin which held that common law negligence claims are
preempted continues to stand today as long as the defendant complies with the require-
ments listed in section 20106(b)(1y') (emphasis added); Crabbe v. Consol. Rail Corp., 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80895, at *17 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2007); Mastrocola v. Se. Pa. Transp.
Auth., 941 A.2d 81, 93 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008).
113. See Railroad Operating Rules, 73 Fed. Reg. 8442, 8456 (Feb. 13, 2008) (to be codi-
fied at 49 C.F.R. pt. 217).
114. Hunter v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Ltd., No. 07-3314, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85110, at
*15-16 (D. Minn. Nov. 16, 2007) ("Thus, Congress has clearly answered the jurisdictional
question of complete preemption-it does not apply here. However, the railroad can still
raise the affirmative defense of preemption to the trial court that has jurisdiction over the
case.").
115. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (2000).
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Railroad crossings can be divided into two distinct groups-
public crossings and private crossings. Public crossings are those
crossings where a public road and a railroad track intersect. Pri-
vate crossings are where a private road or driveway and a rail-
road track intersect. Public crossings are generally regulated by
federal and state statutory law, whereas private crossings have
historically only been dealt with by the common law.
A. Public Railroad Crossings
Just as there are two separate types of railroad crossings, pub-
lic railroad crossings can be further broken down into two distinct
categories-those with automated warning devices and those
with passive warning devices. As discussed previously, both the
FRA and the Commonwealth of Virginia regulate public crossings
in Virginia.11 6 Because a thorough review of all laws and regula-
tions related to crossing safety exceeds the scope of a multi-topic
law review article, this article will focus on the Commonwealth of
Virginia's regulation of public crossings.
1. Crossing Elimination Program-Virginia Code Section 56-
366.1
Virginia Code section 56-366.1 pertains to the process and
means by which railroads coordinate with the Secretary of
Transportation to eliminate "grade crossings by grade separation
or to widen, strengthen, remodel, relocate or replace existing
crossing structures on public highways."117 Specifically, section
56-366.1 regulates the plans, specifications, costs, and division of
labor between the Commonwealth of Virginia and various rail-
road providers when a new crossing is expected to be built or an
old crossing is expected to be replaced or updated.118 The statute
is inapplicable unless the road on which the crossing is main-
tained is part of the state highway system or is otherwise a public
highway maintained by a locality. 119
116. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 234.1-234.275 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-355.1 to -369,
56-405 to -412.2 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-366.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (emphasis added).
118. See id.
119. Id.
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In 1996, the General Assembly defined "highway" as "any pub-
lic highway, road, or street maintained by the Virginia Depart-
ment of Transportation or for which maintenance payments are
made pursuant to §§ 33.1-23.5:1 and 33.1-41.1."120 Prior to 1996,
courts in Virginia had determined that public highways were
generally defined as those owned by the state,12 1 but that there
were "a narrowly defined class of cases, [in which] a technically
private crossing [took] on the attributes of a public crossing for
purposes of the statute."122 It is unclear whether the General As-
sembly's decision to define public highway will alter the Supreme
Court of Virginia's analysis of what crossings are "public" cross-
ings in Virginia, but the supreme court has historically held that
the General Assembly's defining of a term following the court's
defining of a term renders the court's definition without legal ef-
fect.123 The General Assembly's decision to adopt a more strin-
gent definition of public highway in 1996 may very well operate
to eliminate the need to discuss the character or use of a crossing
as a means for determining whether the crossing is public or pri-
vate in nature. The resulting test would obviously be whether the
road is "maintained by the Virginia Department of Transporta-
tion or for which maintenance payments are made pursuant to §§
33.1-23.5:1 and 33.1-41.1."124
120. See Act of Mar. 6, 1996, ch. 114, 1996 Va. Acts 205 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
56-355.2 (Repl. Vol. 2007)). For informational purposes, section 33.1-23.5:1 pertains to
counties who have elected to withdraw from the secondary system of state highway, and
section 33.1-41.1 pertains to hard-surface road maintenance by cities or towns. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 33.1-23.5:1, -41.1 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum. Supp. 2008).
121. See Weaver v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 863 F. Supp. 291, 294 (W.D. Va. 1994)
(citing Virginian Ry. Co. v. Rodgers, 170 Va. 581, 584, 197 S.E. 476, 477 (1938)).
122. Id. (citing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Pulliam, 185 Va. 908, 912-13, 41 S.E.2d
54, 56 (1947)); see also Southern Ry. Co. v. Abee's Adm'r., 124 Va. 379, 382-83, 98 S.E. 31,
32 (1919) (finding a crossing owned by a private furniture company within the scope of a
Virginia statute regulating public crossings).
123. See, e.g., Williams v. Fairfax County Redev. & Hous. Auth., 227 Va. 309, 314, 315
S.E.2d 202, 204-05 (1984) (stating that the General Assembly is "presumed to use the lan-
guage as judicially defined" when it does not change the judicial definition in a subsequent
statutory revision).
124. See Act of Mar. 6, 1996, ch. 114, 1996 Va. Acts 205 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
56-355.2 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
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2. Maintenance of Crossings in Good Repair-Virginia Code
Sections 56-405 and 405.02
Virginia Code section 56-405 provides that "[a]t every cross-
ing .. of a public road by a railroad or of a railroad by a public
highway at grade, it shall be the duty of the railroad company to
keep such crossing in good repair to the full width of the public
highway" and to otherwise maintain the crossing in good re-
pair.125 Similarly, Virginia Code section 56-405.02 provides:
When adjustments are made to railway trackage grade which crosses
public rights-of-way in use as public highway or street in any locali-
ty, the railway company making such adjustments to their trackage
shall also ... maintain a safe vertical relationship between trackage
and street surfaces and to insure positive storm drainage. 126
In essence, each of these statutory sections merely provides that
railroads should keep the crossing in good repair where it crosses
a public highway.
3. Use of Crossbucks-Virginia Code Section 56-405.2
Virginia Code section 56-405.2 requires that railroad crossing
signs-more commonly known as crossbucks-be installed at
every public railroad crossing in the Commonwealth of Virgin-
ia. 127 Specifically, section 56-405.2 provides:
Every railroad company shall cause signal boards, hereinafter re-
ferred to as crossbucks, well supported by posts or otherwise and ap-
proved by the Department of Transportation at such heights as to be
easily seen by travelers from both directions of the public highway,
and not obstructing travel, containing in capital letters, at least five
inches high, the inscription "railroad crossing," to be placed, and con-
stantly maintained, at each public highway at or near, and on both
sides of, each place where it is crossed by the railroad at the same
level. 128
The signs described within section 56-405.2 are the "X" shaped
signs that contain the words "Railroad Crossing." Other signs
that warn of upcoming railroad crossings are more commonly re-
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-405 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-405.02 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-405.2 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
128. Id.
[Vol. 43:337
RAILROAD LAW
ferred to as "advance warning signs" and are generally yellow in
color.
The federal government has historically provided federal funds
to encourage states to upgrade the warning devices present at
public crossings around the country.129 Where federal funds are
used to upgrade a crossing warning device to an automatic warn-
ing device or even a reflectorized crossbuck, claims regarding the
inadequacy of those warnings for motorists are preempted by fed-
eral law. 130 Because use of federal funds by the Commonwealth of
Virginia to upgrade crossing warning devices is subject to ap-
proval by the FRA, successful and complete upgrades are given
the blessing of the FRA and thus cannot be attacked as inade-
quate. 131
In an effort to maximize the diligence of drivers at railroad
crossings, Virginia outlaws erecting, moving, or placing a cross-
buck anywhere other than around a public crossing.132 Virginia
Code section 56-408 provides that "[n]o device or sign which is in
the form of a railroad crossing signboard shall be erected or per-
mitted to remain on or near any of the public roads of this Com-
monwealth."133
4. Installation of Automated Warning Devices-Virginia Code
Sections 56-406.1 to 406.2
Virginia Code section 56-406.1 governs the installation of au-
tomated warning devices at public crossings within the Com-
monwealth of Virginia. Section 56-406.1 provides:
A railroad shall not unilaterally select or determine the type of grade
crossing warning system to be installed at any crossing of a public
highway and railroad at grade. The railroad shall only install or up-
129. See Norfolk S. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 350 (2000) (discussing the use of fed-
eral funds by the Tennessee Department of Transportation to install warning signs at
railroad crossings).
130. Id. at 358 ("[23 C.F.R. s]ections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) 'cover the subject matter' of
the adequacy of warning devices installed with the participation of federal funds. As a re-
sult, the FRSA pre-empts respondent's state tort claim that the advance warning signs
and reflectorized crossbucks installed at the Oakwood Church Road crossing were inade-
quate.").
131. See id. at 359 ("Once the FHWA approved the project and the signs were installed
using federal funds, the federal standard for adequacy displaced Tennessee statutory and
common law addressing the same subject, thereby pre-empting respondent's claim.").
132. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-408 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
133. Id.
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grade a grade crossing warning system at any crossing of a public
highway and railroad at grade pursuant to an agreement with the
Virginia Department of Transportation or representative of the ap-
propriate public road authority authorized to enter into such agree-
ments. 134
The language makes fairly clear that railroads in Virginia are
without the legal authority to specify or install unilaterally any
type of automatic warning device, thereby displacing any com-
mon-law duty to do so.
In Chandler v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia was
asked to interpret whether a previous version of Virginia Code
section 56-406.1 displaced a railroad's common-law duty to erect
additional warnings at "hazardous" public crossings.135 The court
noted that "[i]n Virginia, the common law remains in force except
where it is changed by statutory or constitutional law."136 The
court also observed that "[t]he common law places upon railroads
the responsibility for making railroad crossings safe ... include-
[ing] the obligation to discover crossings that are especially,
extraordinarily, or extra-hazardous and to make them reasonably
safe by erecting lights or other protective devices there."137 In or-
der for a statute to change the common law, the court reasoned,
the "legislative intent to change the common law must be 'clear,'
or 'plainly manifested."'138
The court, claiming that the statute did not manifest an ex-
press intent to change the common law, held that "the language
does not eradicate the long-standing, independent, common-law
duty imposed on railroads."139 Rather, it reasoned, the statute's
focus was "on granting to certain governmental bodies authority
to initiate a procedure for making railroad crossings safer in the
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-406.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (emphasis added).
135. 882 F. Supp. 533, 534 (E.D. Va. 1995). There is nothing about the crossing at issue
in this case that is hazardous, and it has not been deemed hazardous by the Common-
wealth of Virginia.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Bangley v. Virginian Ry. Co., 195 Va. 340, 346, 78 S.E.2d 696, 700
(1953); John F. Ivory Storage Co. v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 187 Va. 857, 868-69, 48
S.E.2d 242, 248-49 (1948); Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Clements, 184 Va. 656, 667-68, 36
S.E.2d 553, 558 (1946)).
138. Id. (citing Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1992); Griffith v. Raven
Red Ash Coal Co., 179 Va. 790, 797, 20 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1942)).
139. Id. at 535.
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'public interest' and for allocating costs between the railroad and
government when the changes are required by the govern-
ment."140
The following year, the General Assembly amended Virginia
Code section 56-406.1 as follows:
Section 56-406.1. Proceedings for installation and maintenance of
automatically operated gates, signals and other automatic crossing
warning devices.
Railroads shall cooperate with the Virginia Department of Transpor-
tation and the Department of Rail and Public Transportation in fur-
nishing information and technical assistance to enable the Common-
wealth to develop plans and project priorities for the elimination of
hazardous conditions at any crossing of a public highway which
crosses at grade including, but not limited to grade crossing elimina-
tion, reconstruction of existing grade crossings, and grade crossing
improvements. The Commonwealth shall provide each locality a list-
ing of their grade crossing safety needs for its consideration. Infor-
mation collected and analyses undertaken by the designated state
agencies are subject to 23 U.S.C. § 409. A railroad shall not unilate-
rally select or determine the type of grade crossing warning system to
be installed at any crossing of a public highway and railroad at
grade. The railroad shall only install or upgrade a grade crossing
warning system at any crossing of a public highway and railroad at
grade pursuant to an agreement with the Virginia Department of
Transportation or representative of the appropriate public road au-
thority authorized to enter into such agreements. A railroad is not re-
quired but is permitted to upgrade, at its own expense, components
of any public highway at grade warning system when such upgrade
is incidental to a railroad improvement project relating to track,
structures or train control systems.
When required by the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner
or representative of the appropriate public road authority, every rail-
road company shall cause a grade crossing warning device including
flashing lights approved by the Department of Transportation at
such heights as to be easily seen by travelers, and not obstructing
travel, to be placed, and maintained at each public highway at or
near each place where it is crossed by the railroad at the same level.
Such warning device shall be automatically activated by the ap-
proaching train so as to be clearly discernible to travelers approach-
ing the railroad crossing from each direction at a distance of two
hundred feet. Such warning devices shall be erected at the initiative
of the appropriate public road authority only when required by or-
140. Id.
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dinance or resolution adopted by the Commissioner or the appropri-
ate public road authority thereof stating that such political subdivi-
sion will pay the full initial installation cost of such warning devices
and that maintenance costs will be fixed as provided in § 56-406.2. A
certified copy of such ordinance or resolution shall be delivered to
such railroad company, and such railroad company shall forthwith
install such warning devices at the full initial cost of such public
road authority. The cost of such installation and maintenance of such
warning devices may be shared by agreement between such railroad
company and the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner or
the appropriate public road authority, when initiating such installa-
tion. The railroad shall be responsible for the continuing mainten-
ance of the warning devices. 1 4 1
There can be little doubt that the General Assembly's amend-
ment to the statute was specifically designed to address the lack
of "clarity" in displacing the common law that was outlined by the
court in Chandler. The new legislation specifically withdrew the
permissive language of the statute and prohibited railroads from
installing additional warning devices without first obtaining
permission from the Commissioner of the Department of Trans-
portation, thereby placing the determination and issue of addi-
tional warnings squarely within the discretion of the Common-
wealth of Virginia. 142
Even under the court's opinion in Chandler, the revised lan-
guage proscribes claims of inadequate warnings at "hazardous"
crossings in Virginia.143 Specifically, the court noted that such
claims would likely be precluded if the statute was worded as fol-
lows:
With due regard for safety and for the integrity of operations by
highway and railroad users, the highway agency and the railroad
company are entitled to jointly occupy the right-of-way in the con-
duct of their assigned duties. This requires joint responsibility in the
traffic control function between the public agency and the railroad.
The determination of need and selection of devices at a grade cross-
ing is made by the public agency with jurisdictional authority. Sub-
ject to such determination and selection, the design, installation and
operation shall be in accordance with the national standards con-
tained [in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices]. 144
141. Act of Mar. 6, 1996, ch. 114, 1996 Va. Acts 205 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-406.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007)) (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 213.
143. See Chandler, 882 F. Supp. at 536.
144. Id. (quoting MANUAL ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES § 8A-1 (1988)).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia has made clear that the Gener-
al Assembly is presumed to know of judicial decisions affecting
the law when revisions are made.145 Because the language of Vir-
ginia Code section 56-406.1 is even more restrictive than the lan-
guage cited by the Court as preclusive, it would appear that
common-law claims of inadequate warnings at public crossings
are precluded. 146
5. Maintenance of Railroad Rights-of-Way-Virginia Code
Section 56-411
Virginia Code section 56-411 provides that "[e]very railway
company... shall be required to clear from its right-of-way trees
and brush for 100 [feet] on each side of public road crossings at
grade when such trees or brush would otherwise obstruct the
view of approaching trains."147 Not every piece of brush or vege-
tation is required to be cut back pursuant to this statute, only
those that obstruct a motorist's view of approaching trains.148
Where brush is not cut back, however, a motorist's duty under
Virginia law actually increases, and a failure to exercise due care
could result in any claim for injury being barred under Virginia's
contributory negligence doctrine. 149
145. See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 273 Va. 564, 576, 643
S.E.2d 219, 225 (2007) ("In interpreting a statute, we presume that the General Assembly
acted with full knowledge of the law in the area in which it dealt." (citing United Masonry,
Inc. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 233 Va. 476, 480, 357 S.E.2d 509, 512 (1987); Powers v. County
Sch. Bd. of Dickenson County, 148 Va. 661, 668, 139 S.E. 262, 264 (1927))).
146. See Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488, 503, 621 S.E.2d 48, 55-56 (2005). ("[The
Court] presume[s] that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted
the statute. Courts cannot add language to the statute the General Assembly has not seen
fit to include. Nor are they permitted to accomplish the same result by judicial interpreta-
tion. Where the General Assembly has expressed its intent in clear and unequivocal
terms, it is not the province of the judiciary to add words to the statute or alter its plain
meaning." (quoting Jackson v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313, 608 S.E.2d 901, 906
(2005))).
147. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-411 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
148. Id.
149. See Wright v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 245 Va. 160, 171, 427 S.E.2d 724, 730 (1993)
("[A] railroad track is a proclamation of danger and the operator of a vehicle approaching a
grade crossing 'is required to look and listen at a time and place when both looking and
listening will be effective,' intelligently using both eyes and ears." (quoting Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co. v. Epling, 189 Va. 551, 557, 53 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1949)) (emphasis added)).
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6. Obstruction of Railroad Crossings-Virginia Code Section 56-
412.1
Virginia Code section 56-412.1 provides that "[i]t shall be un-
lawful for any railroad company ... to obstruct for a longer period
than five minutes the free passage on any street or road by stand-
ing cars or trains across the same." 150 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia has made clear that Virginia Code section 56-412.1 must on-
ly be read to apply to trains that are standing still rather than
moving, because any application of the statute to moving trains
would run afoul of the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. 151
More recently, courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that
statutes like Virginia Code section 56-412.1 are preempted by the
FRSA.152 In Village of Mundelein v. Wisconsin Central Railroad,
the Supreme Court of Illinois was asked to determine whether
the FRSA preempted Mundelein's statute prohibiting the block-
ing of railroad crossings. 153 The court noted that "[t]he plain lan-
guage of the [Village] ordinance applies exclusively to railroad
operations, requiring rail carriers to prevent obstructions of
highway grade crossings except in certain specified circums-
tances."154 The court noted that the FRSA's "regulations on train
speed, air-brake testing, and grade crossing safety work together
to regulate and control the movement of trains at grade crossings
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-412.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007). Sometimes local police officers will
cite train operators or crewmembers for violating this section, but such citations are im-
proper under the statute because only railroad companies may be fined under its terms.
See id. The lack of any statutory language corresponding to that for overweight citations
making service upon the driver service upon the company, such citation of crewmembers is
improper and should be dismissed. Compare id. with VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1132 (Repl.
Vol. 2005) ("Any person, whether resident or nonresident, who permits the operation of a
motor vehicle in the Commonwealth by his agent or employee shall be deemed to have ap-
pointed the operator of such motor vehicle his statutory agent for the purpose of service of
process in any proceeding against such person agrowing out of any weight violation involv-
ing such motor vehicle.") (emphasis added).
151. See Ocean View Improvement Corp. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 205 Va. 949, 954, 140
S.E.2d 700, 703 (1965) (concluding that if blocked crossing statutes "were construed to ap-
ply to moving trains, the ordinance[s], in effect, would or could limit the length of a train
and thereby unreasonably hinder the free flow of commerce between the states in contra-
vention of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution").
152. See, e.g., Vill. of Mundelein v. Wis. Cent. R.R., 882 N.E.2d 544, 553-54 (11. 2008)
(listing state and federal decisions considering whether blocked crossing laws are
preempted by the FRSA).
153. Id. at 546.
154. Id. at 550.
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... [and] control whether a train may be moved and the speed of
a moving train."155 As a result, "the overall structure of these
regulations substantially subsumes the subject matter of the
movement of trains at grade crossings ... [and] manifest[s] a
clear intent to preempt the Village's ordinance on that subject
matter."156 Other courts around the country have reached similar
conclusions, all concerning statutes virtually identical to Virginia
Code section 56-412.1.157
7. The Sounding of Warnings at Public Crossings-Virginia
Code Sections 56-414 and 56-416
There is no mistaking the sound of a locomotive horn (histori-
cally referred to as a whistle, dating to when engines were oper-
ated by steam). Virginia Code section 56-414 regulates the sound-
ing of locomotive horns at public crossings, and provides:
Every railroad company shall provide each locomotive passing upon
its road with a bell of ordinary size and steam whistle or horn, and
such whistle or horn shall be sharply sounded outside cities and
towns at least twice at a distance of not less than 300 yards nor more
than 600 yards from the place where the railroad crosses upon the
same level any public highway or crossing, and such bell shall be
rung or whistle or horn sounded continuously or alternately until the
locomotive has reached such highway crossing, and shall give such
signals in cities and towns as their local governing bodies may re-
quire.158
The specific language of the statute makes clear that its provi-
sions do not apply to the sounding of bells and whistles within the
jurisdictional limits of cities or towns, and practitioners must look
to the city's or town's ordinances to determine whether such
warnings are required.159 Virginia Code section 56-416 provides
155. Id. at 553.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Plymouth, 92 F. Supp. 2d 643, 653 (E.D.
Mich. 2000), aff'd, 283 F.3d 812, 814 (6th Cir. 2002); Krentz v. Consol. Rail Corp., 910
A.2d 20, 35 (Pa. 2006).
158. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-414 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (emphasis added).
159. See id.; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Gilliam, 211 Va. 542, 545-46, 178 S.E.2d 499, 502
(1971) ('The warnings required by Code § 56-414 are not applicable to public grade cross-
ings within the corporate limits of cities and towns.") (emphasis added); see also Norfolk &
W. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 217 Va. 515, 519, 229 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1976); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
Lassiter, 193 Va. 360, 363, 68 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1952); At. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Clements,
184 Va. 656, 665, 36 S.E.2d 553, 557 (1946); S. Ry. Co. v. Davis., 152 Va. 548, 551, 147 S.E.
228, 228 (1929); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Wilkes, 137 Va. 302, 306, 119 S.E. 122, 124
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that where the signals required by Virginia Code section 56-414
have not been given, then Virginia's contributory negligence doc-
trine may not be used as a bar to recovery. 160 Rather, a motorist's
or a pedestrian's negligence may only be used in mitigation of
damages-i.e., comparative negligence applies.161
Recently, however, the FRA promulgated new regulations go-
verning the sounding of warning signals by locomotives at public
crossings in the United States.162 The express purpose of the new
regulations is "to provide for safety at public highway-rail grade
crossings by requiring locomotive horn use at public highway-rail
grade crossings except in quiet zones established and maintained
in accordance with this part."163 Further, the FRA made clear
that the new provisions are applicable to the "sounding [of] loco-
motive horns when locomotives approach and pass through public
highway-rail grade crossings." 164 Most importantly, the FRA's
regulations specify that "issuance of this part preempts any State
law, rule, regulation, or order governing the sounding of the lo-
comotive horn at public highway-rail grade crossings, in accor-
dance with 49 U.S.C. [§] 20106."165 As discussed previously, the
FRA has clearly manifested its intent to cover completely the sub-
ject of sounding warning devices at public railroad crossings.166
Given the clear regulatory mandate, it appears that Virginia
Code sections 56-414 and 56-416 have been preempted by federal
regulation.
8. The Standing Train Doctrine-Virginia Has Remained Silent
There are enough cases involving motorists running into the
side of a stopped train that courts across the country have crafted
a legal doctrine to deal specifically with those cases-the "stand-
ing train" doctrine. 167 Essentially, the standing train doctrine
provides that "in the absence of statute, or special conditions of
hazard to motorists, there is no duty on the railway company to
(1923).
160. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-416 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
161. Id.; see also Gilliam, 211 Va. at 546, 178 S.E.2d at 503.
162. 49 C.F.R. §§ 222.1-222.59 (2007).
163. Id. § 222.1.
164. Id. § 222.3.
165. Id. § 222.7.
166. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 358-59 (2000).
167. See 65 AM. JUR. 2D Railroads § 367, at 445 (2001).
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provide special warning or safeguards to motorists ... to prevent
collisions with cars standing on or moving across a public grade
crossing."168 Courts have reasoned that '[u]nder ordinary condi-
tions the presence of a railroad train or car upon a crossing is
adequate notice to a traveler approaching the crossing and so the
railroad employees need not give additional notice or warning of
the"' train in the crossing. 169 In fact, an increasing number of
courts throughout the country have begun to follow the standing
train doctrine. 170
168. Wojciechowski v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 173 So. 2d 72, 77 (Ala. 1965).
169. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cogburn, 315 P.2d 209, 212-13 (Colo. 1957) (quoting Anno-
tation, Liability of Railroad for Injury Due to Road Vehicle Running into Train or Car
Standing on Highway Crossing, 161 A.L.R. 111, 127-28 (1946)).
170. See, e.g., Davis v. Burlington N., Inc., 663 F.2d 1028, 1030 (10th Cir. 1981) (apply-
ing Oklahoma law) ("Ordinarily, the presence of a train or railway cars on a crossing,
whether moving or stationary, is sufficient notice to a driver of a vehicle on the highway of
such obstruction and, in the absence of unusual circumstances, the operating railway
company is not under any duty to provide any other notice or warning." (quoting Kan., Ok-
la. & Gulf Ry. Co. v. Painter, 333 P.2d 547, 548 (Okla. 1953))); Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v.
Kammerer, 205 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir. 1953) (applying Georgia law) ("(Tihe trial court
erred in refusing to charge . . .that when a train is standing on a crossing, it is of itself
ordinarily sufficient notice of the danger, and it is unnecessary to use gates or flagmen...
to call attention to that which every prudent person should see."); Sisson v. S. Ry. Co., 68
F.2d 403, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (observing that the failure of a railroad to maintain a light
at a crossing occupied by a standing train is not actionable negligence); Dunn v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. Co., 537 N.E.2d 738, 741 (Ill. 1989) ("[A] train stopped at a crossing is gener-
ally held to be adequate notice and warning of its presence ... and the railroad is under no
duty to give additional signs, signals, or warnings."); Jones v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 282 P. 593, 594 (Kan. 1963) ('"There is no statute which requires a railway
company to warn travelers there is a freight train across the highway when those condi-
tions exist, and a railway company rests under no common-law duty to take such precau-
tions for the benefit of drivers of auto vehicles."); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 167 S.W.2d
841, 842 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943) ('The railroad company is justified in assuming that motor-
ists will have lights and will drive so as to be able to see the train and bring the automo-
biles to a stop."); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Switzer, 122 S.W.2d 967, 969 (Ky. Ct. App.
1938) ("Ordinarily, the presence of a train on a grade crossing is a sufficient warning of
danger to a traveler on the highway."); Allen v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 53 N.W.2d 607,
608 (Mich. 1952) ("[The presence of a railroad train on a crossing is notice and warning to
those using the highway, and . . . railroads will only be chargeable with negligence if
there are unusual conditions which require additional warnings."); Clark v. Columbus &
Greenville Ry. Co., 473 So.2d 947, 950 (Miss. 1985) ("We have too many cases recognizing
that ordinarily a train legitimately stopped or standing over a public crossing because of
its tremendous size is all the warning the traveling public is entitled to."); Los Angeles &
Salt Lake R.R. Co. v. Lytle, 47 P.2d 934, 937 (Nev. 1935) ("It may be stated as a general
principle of law that a railroad company, in the absence of a statute requiring lights or
other precautions, may not be chargeable with actionable negligence merely because its
train is at rest on a crossing ... and is run into by an auto traveling on the highway.");
Killen v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 232 N.Y.S. 76, 79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1928) ("Here there is noth-
ing to indicate that the condition created at the crossing by the standing train was espe-
cially hazardous, and defendant was not bound to anticipate so uncommon an accident.");
Young v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 146 S.E.2d 441, 444 (N.C. 1966) (applying Ohio law)
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No case has been presented to a court of record in Virginia that
would provide any guidance as to what the rule would be in cases
involving a standing train on a crossing. The Supreme Court of
Virginia has clearly stated that even where automatic warning
signals are not working properly, a driver "must still exercise care
to use his senses and give heed to other existing warnings suffi-
cient of themselves to tell him the train is coming."171 Specifical-
ly, where a driver fails to utilize some other means of ascertain-
ing safety at a crossing-even where the automatic devices are
not functioning-reasonable minds may find that the driver
caused the accident. 172 The court has reasoned that "[n]either
gongs nor gates relieve a traveler from the exercise of ordinary
care and caution."173 Indeed, the court has even precluded recov-
ery in those cases in which a driver was directed to cross by a
flagman, but failed to look for the presence of a train himself.174
Given the court's firm stance on requiring motorists to remain
diligent at all railroad crossings for the approach of trains-even
those with automated warning devices-it would appear that the
failure to detect the presence of a train in the crossing would be
negligence on the part of the driver as a matter of law. Given that
all drivers in Virginia are obligated to look and listen at all rail-
road crossings when looking or listening would be effective,175
Virginia law and precedent appear consistent with the applica-
tion of the standing train doctrine.
("A passenger in a motor vehicle which is driven into the side of a train standing... over a
grade crossing cannot in the absence of special circumstances rendering the crossing pecu-
liarly hazardous recover from the railroad for injuries received.") (internal quotation
marks omitted); Fort Worth & Denver Ry. Co. v. Williams, 375 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex.
1964) ("[T]he presence of a train on a crossing blocking a public highway does not in itself
constitute an extra hazardous crossing."); Hendrickson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 136 P.2d
438, 441 (Wash. 1943) ("The railroad company... has the right to stop its train across the
highway and permit a car to remain thereon for a reasonable length of time, and, if there
are no unusual circumstances, it is not chargeable with negligence if guards are not sta-
tioned, or lights or other signals are not placed, so as to warn travelers on the highway of
the presence of the train or car thereon.").
171. S. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 186 Va. 106, 113, 41 S.E.2d 456, 459 (1947) (emphasis
added).
172. See id.
173. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Wellons, 155 Va. 218, 222, 154 S.E. 575, 577 (1930).
174. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Benton, 160 Va. 633, 642-43, 169 S.E. 560, 563-64 (1933).
175. See Wright v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 245 Va. 160, 171, 427 S.E.2d 724, 730 (1993)
("[A] railroad track is [itself] a proclamation of danger and the operator of a vehicle ap-
proaching a grade crossing 'is required to look and listen at a time and place when both
looking and listening will be effective,' intelligently using both eyes and ears." (quoting
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Epling, 189 Va. 551, 557, 53 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1949)) (emphasis
added)).
[Vol. 43:337
RAILROAD LAW
9. The Duty of Passengers in Cars Driven over Public Crossings
The Supreme Court of Virginia does not relieve passengers of
the duty to exercise reasonable care for their own safety at rail-
road crossings.176 The duty of a passenger in a car that is about
to be driven over a railroad crossing is clearly defined in a num-
ber of cases, 177 and basically requires a passenger to look and lis-
ten for approaching trains and warn the driver of the near ap-
proach or presence of a train.1 78
In Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Gilliam, two passengers
in a vehicle were killed when the vehicle in which they were rid-
ing was struck by a freight train at a railroad crossing owned and
operated by the defendant.179 One of the passengers was seated
next to the right front door, while the other was seated next to
the right rear door.180 The driver testified that she stopped the
vehicle close to the defendant's track, "looked and listened, and
then proceeded slowly onto the track," where she was struck by
the defendant's train.181 There was conflicting evidence at trial
regarding whether the horn of the train was blown and whether
the bell was rung.18 2 The jury entered judgment in favor of the
passengers' estates.18 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed the decision. 184
The court found that "[aissuming, but not deciding, that defen-
dant failed to meet its common law dut[ies] ... and that such a
failure was a proximate cause of the collision . . . the dece-
dent[s] ... were both contributorily negligent as a matter of law
and... their negligence bars a recovery."185 The court stated that
both passengers "were in a better position to see defendant's train
176. See Butler v. Darden, 189 Va. 459, 465-66, 53 S.E.2d 146, 149 (1949).
177. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Gilliam, 211 Va. 542, 546-47, 178 S.E.2d 499,
503 (1971); Mann v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 199 Va. 604, 611, 101 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1958),
Butler, 189 Va. at 465, 53 S.E.2d at 149; Hancock v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 149 Va. 829,
835, 141 S.E. 849, 850 (1928).
178. See Gilliam, 211 Va. at 547, 178 S.E.2d at 503.
179. Id. at 543, 178 S.E.2d at 500-01.
180. Id. at 544, 178 S.E.2d at 501.
181. Id.
182. See id., 178 S.E.2d at 501-02.
183. Id. at 543, 178 S.E.2d at 501.
184. Id. at 546-47, 178 S.E.2d at 503.
185. Id.
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than was the driver with whom they were riding."186 The court
also stated that both passengers "were awake and in possession of
their faculties."187 Thus, according to the court, "there was noth-
ing for them to do but to look and listen."188 The court concluded
that in such circumstances, passengers are "charged with the du-
ty of exercising reasonable care for their own safety . . . [which]
entails looking and listening when it will be effective so that the
driver can be warned."189 What is of particular interest in this
case is the court's treatment of front and rear passengers similar-
ly, and the imposition of the same duty on both. 190
In Mann v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., the plaintiffs dece-
dent was a passenger in a truck whose right side was struck by
the protruding part of a railroad's train. 191 At the time of the col-
lision, the truck was three to four feet from the track.192 The
driver of the truck and the passenger were both familiar with the
crossing and the train schedule.193 At trial, there was evidence
that the approaching train could have been seen from eighteen
feet back from the track, "which would have given a careful driver
ample time to stop in safety."194 The trial court struck the plain-
tiffs evidence and entered judgment for the railroad.195 The
plaintiff subsequently appealed. 196
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that
"[plaintiffs decedent was in a better position to see the train
than [the driver] was for he was seated on the right side of the
cab, from which direction the train was approaching."197 The
court also found that the plaintiffs decedent "was wide awake
and in possession of all his faculties."198 Thus, according to the
court, "[t]here was nothing for him to do but look and listen."199
186. Id. at 547, 178 S.E.2d at 503.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 546-47, 178 S.E.2d at 503.
191. 199 Va. 604, 606-07, 101 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1958).
192. Id. at 607, 101 S.E.2d at 537.
193. Id. at 606, 101 S.E.2d at 536-37.
194. Id. at 611, 101 S.E.2d at 540.
195. Id. at 605, 101 S.E.2d at 536.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 611, 101 S.E.2d at 540.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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The court stated that the plaintiffs decedent "was charged with
the duty of exercising reasonable care for his own safety," and if
the plaintiffs decedent, who was wide awake, had looked and lis-
tened, he would have seen the approaching train.200 The court
concluded, therefore, that "the evidence clearly shows plaintiffs
decedent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law
which bars a recovery."201
In Butler v. Darden, the plaintiffs decedent "was killed when
the front end of the automobile in which he was riding as a guest"
was hit by a train at a railroad crossing.202 The plaintiff brought
suit against both the driver of the vehicle and the railroad.203 To
sustain recovery against the driver, the plaintiff was required to
prove that the driver was guilty of gross negligence because the
decedent was a guest passenger in the car. 204 The jury rendered a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, which was subsequently set aside
by the trial court.205 The plaintiff appealed the court's deci-
sion. 206
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the
trial court.207 The court concluded that, although there was evi-
dence the jury could have used to find gross negligence on the
part of the driver, the decedent was guilty of contributory negli-
gence because he failed to look and listen and warn the driver of
the approaching train.208 The court found that both the driver
and the decedent were familiar with the crossing.209 Although
neither the driver nor the decedent saw the train until their au-
tomobile was on the track, the court found that the decedent had
at least forty-five feet to ascertain such information.2 10 In addi-
tion, the court found the decedent was in the same or better posi-
tion than the driver to observe the danger from the train.2 11 Hav-
ing failed to take any precautions for his own safety, the court
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 189 Va. 459, 461, 53 S.E.2d 146, 147 (1949).
203. Id. at 462, 53 S.E.2d at 147.
204. Id. at 464, 53 S.E.2d at 148.
205. Id. at 462, 53 S.E.2d at 147.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 471, 53 S.E.2d at 152.
208. Id. at 465-66, 53 S.E.2d at 148-49.
209. Id. at 465, 53 S.E.2d at 148-49.
210. Id., 53 S.E.2d at 149.
211. Id.
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held that the plaintiffs decedent was guilty of contributory negli-
gence. 212
In Hancock v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., the plaintiff was
injured at a railroad crossing when the vehicle in which she was
riding as a passenger collided with a passenger train of the rail-
road.2 13 At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was sitting on
the lap of another passenger in the front seat on the vehicle.2 14
The plaintiff contended that the railroad "was negligent in ap-
proaching the crossing without giving timely warnings to travel-
ers on the highway and particularly at this place which was per-
mitted to be and remain[ed] in a dangerous condition as a direct
result of which she was injured."215 At trial, the railroad de-
murred to the evidence, which was sustained by the court.2 16 The
plaintiff subsequently appealed. 2 17
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the
plaintiffs "right of recovery must turn upon the question of the
plaintiffs contributory negligence, which ... pre-supposes the
primary negligence of the [railroad], and is quite independent of
the negligence of the driver of the car which could not under the
facts of the case be imputed to the plaintiff."218 The court noted
that because a railroad track is a signal of danger, a person's
"failure to exercise reasonable precaution for his own protection is
contributory negligence, and bars a recovery." 219 The court found
that "had the plaintiff looked for the on-coming train, as was her
duty to do, it could have been seen in ample time for her to have
cautioned the driver of the impending peril."220 The court held
that the plaintiff was "clearly guilty of concurring negligence,
212. See id. at 467, 53 S.E.2d at 150.
213. 149 Va. 829, 831-32, 141 S.E. 849, 849 (1928).
214. Id. at 832, 141 S.E. at 849.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 831, 141 S.E. at 849.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 834, 141 S.E. at 850.
219. Id. at 835, 141 S.E. at 850.
220. Id. at 837, 141 S.E. at 851. The court found that the plaintiff was riding on the lap
of another passenger, which put her farther to the front of the car than any other passen-
ger, and that the accident occurred during the day. Id. at 838, 141 S.E. at 851. According
to the court, had the plaintiff looked she could have seen the train further up the track
than the driver of the vehicle, and sitting across the lap of another passenger provided no
excuse for disregarding this duty. Id.
[Vol. 43:337
RAILROAD LAW
without which in all probability she would not have sustained the
injuries complained of."221
Once again, this line of cases reiterates the Supreme Court of
Virginia's long history of requiring significant diligence on the
part of drivers and passengers at railroad crossings. Although
cases may be factually different from one another, the court has
historically refused to accept many excuses for a vehicle occu-
pant's failure to detect a train at a crossing.
B. Private Railroad Crossings
Unlike public railroad crossings, which are heavily regulated
by both the state and federal governments, private railroad cross-
ings are typically governed primarily by private contract and
common law. Private crossings can be anything from an entrance
into a facility to an individual person's driveway. Though there is
currently no federal or state regulation of private crossings, the
FRA has issued a notice of the Agency's intent to begin regulating
private crossings. 222
The Supreme Court of Virginia has made clear that
'[only] constant or frequent use by the public of a private crossing,
with the knowledge and acquiescence of the railway company, may
give to such a passageway the attributes of a public crossing and cast
upon the railway company the duty of exercising ordinary care for the
safety of such users.'2 2 3
221. Id. at 844, 141 S.E. at 853.
222. See Safety of Private Highway-Rail Grade Crossings; Notice of Safety Inquiry, 72
Fed. Reg. 18,730, 18,730 (Apr. 13, 2007). The FRA has issued the following notice:
FRA intends to solicit oral statements from private crossing owners, rai-
lroads, and other interested parties on issues related to the safety of private
highway-rail grade crossings, which will include, but not be limited to, cur-
rent practices concerning the responsibility for safety at private grade cross-
ings, the 'adequacy of warning devices at private crossings, and the relative
merits of a more uniform approach to improving safety at private crossings.
FRA has also opened a public docket on these issues so that interested par-
ties may submit written comments for public review and consideration.
Id. Obviously federal control over private railroad crossings would come under the FRSA
and would trigger the same preemptive effect of other regulations promulgated thereund-
er. This is something for practitioners to consider in the near future as federal regulations
of private railroad crossings will impact real estate law, commercial law, and obviously
railroad law.
223. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Fletcher, 198 Va. 397, 401, 94 S.E.2d 251, 254 (1956)
(quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Faison, 189 Va. 341, 345, 52 S.E.2d 865, 867
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Thus, where the crossing is private in nature and the injured par-
ty is "not within the category of those persons for whose use the
crossing was installed, he [is] at best a bare licensee on the prop-
erty of the Railway Company and [takes] the crossing as he found
it."224 The court's language is particularly telling regarding the
duty at a private crossing-constant use by the public may "cast
upon the railway company the duty to exercising ordinary care
for the safety of such users."225 In other words, where a crossing
is not public in nature, there is no duty on the part of the railroad
company to exercise ordinary care for the safety of others. 226
This is consistent with precedent from the Supreme Court of
Virginia concerning private crossings. In Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway Co. v. Faison, for example, the court concluded that the
defendant "owed [the plaintiff] no duty to keep the crossing in a
reasonably safe condition, free of obstruction, or to give him
warning of the presence of the gate."227 The railroad is "only lia-
ble to a licensee for willful and wanton injury which may be in-
flicted by the gross negligence of its agents and employees." 228
Where a party has entered onto the track or onto a private cross-
ing, the court has ruled,
It is not the duty of a railroad company to have a lookout on its front
car ... . A railroad company does not owe to a licensee the duty of
running its train in a particular manner, or at a particular rate of
speed, and is under no obligation to keep a lookout on its car, or ring
its bell, or to blow its whistle, and the mere failure to do any or all of
these things does not give him a right of action. 2 2 9
(1949)) (emphasis added).
224. Faison, 189 Va. at 347, 52 S.E.2d at 868.
225. Fletcher, 198 Va. at 401, 94 S.E.2d at 254 (citation omitted).
226. See id.
227. 189 Va. at 347, 52 S.E.2d at 868.
228. Ingle v. Clinchfield R.R. Co., 169 Va. 131, 137, 192 S.E.782, 784,(1937); see also
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Bullington, 135 Va. 307, 318, 116 S.E. 237, 240 (1923); Che-
sapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Saunders, 116 Va. 826, 833, 83 S.E. 374, 376 (1914); Harlow v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 108 Va. 691, 692, 62 S.E. 941, 942 (1908); Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co. v. Stegall, 105 Va. 538, 542, 54 S.E. 19, 20-21 (1906); Hortenstein v. Virginia-Carolina
Ry. Co., 102 Va. 914, 921, 47 S.E. 996, 998 (1904); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Wood, 99 Va.
156, 159, 37 S.E. 846, 847-48 (1901); Nichols v. Wash., Ohio & W. R.R. Co., 83 Va. 99, 102,
5 S.E. 171, 172-73 (1887).
229. Ingle, 169 Va. at 138, 192 S.E. at 785 (emphasis added); see also Faison, 189 Va. at
347, 52 S.E.2d at 868 (concluding that the driver's usage of the private crossing rendered
him a bare licensee and the railroad owed no duty to him other than not to engage in will-
ful misconduct).
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Although the precedent discussed above generally explains the
obligations of the parties at a private railroad crossing, these ob-
ligations can be altered or changed by contract. In the absence of
such contract, however, users of private railroad crossings are
tasked with exercising diligence-perhaps even more than at
public crossings-because their status as bare licensees entitles
them to nothing more than protection from intentional harm on
the part of the railroad. 230
CONCLUSION
This article explored railroad law in Virginia over more than
just the preceding year. Due to the length of time since a piece
has been written on the topic, this article not only discussed re-
cent changes but also the progression and development of rail-
road law in Virginia in recent years. The unique interplay of state
and federal law in this area of the law can be a daunting task for
practitioners who do not specialize in this area but find them-
selves with a case involving Virginia's railroads. This area of the
law is constantly changing, and thus it is important to reassess
the status of the law any time a case is presented involving rail-
road matters.
230. See Faison, 189 Va. at 347, 52 S.E.2d at 868.
20081

